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1. Introduction
The models of microeconomics are famously idealized and have a famously spotty 
predictive record. Yet recent years have seen some tremendous successes in using 
these models to construct reliable economic institutions. The focus of this chap-
ter is one such institution, namely, spectrum auctions—now used all over Europe 
and North America to distribute licenses to telecommunications fi rms. This has 
been seen as a great triumph for game theory in particular. We shall explore the 
implications of this case for a venerable issue in philosophy of science, namely, the 
status of idealized models. What is the contribution of such models to empirical 
successes? We then use the lessons drawn from the spectrum auction to shed light, 
in turn, on a second venerable issue, namely, scientifi c progress. In particular, we 
explore the question, Is there progress in economics? And if so, what form does it 
take?
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Previous analyses of these issues have often focused on theory in the abstract, 
or else on how models are used in academic discussions. But we believe there is 
much to be gained by examining the dirty details of how theory is actually applied 
when there is much at stake. Those details turn out to be revealing. They are espe-
cially revealing in a case of conspicuously successful application such as the spec-
trum auction, as such a case tells us much about how the gap between idealized 
model and messy world may actually be bridged.
Several well-developed philosophical accounts of models are now available. 
Auction design, meanwhile, is an instance of a larger branch of applied econom-
ics—institution design or, to use Al Roth’s term, design economics. More and 
more, this is a principal arena for the application of microeconomic theory (Roth 
2002), so it is desirable that any account of models speaks to it. Can our case study 
in design economics arbitrate between the different competing accounts? We 
believe that it can. In particular, even though the spectrum auction design is now 
a paradigmatic case of the use of microeconomic theory for policy making, we 
shall argue that none of the existing accounts can explain the role of models in it. 
We, therefore, propose a new account—models as open formulas—that, we claim, 
alone is able to do so.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: We begin in Section 2 by surveying exist-
ing work on scientifi c models, with an eye to the specifi c case of economics. We 
review four accounts in particular—the satisfaction-of-assumptions account, the 
capacities account, the credible-worlds account, and the partial-structures account. 
In Section 3, we tell the detailed story of the 1994 Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) spectrum auction in the United States, highlighting the cru-
cial role of experiment as well as theory. In Section 4, in the light of this case study, 
we present our own open-formula account of economic models.
We are then fi nally ready, in Section 5, to turn to the issue of economic prog-
ress. Our case study enables us to get clear on exactly what has been progressing, 
and on exactly what theory has—and has not—contributed to that. We shall con-
clude that we may not speak of empirical progress in economic theory, or at least 
that the success of the spectrum auction provides no warrant for doing so. Rather, 
progress is better seen as more akin to the worthy but piecemeal variety typical of 
engineering. This in turn has important implications for just what it is about eco-
nomic theory that we should value.
2. Models in Science: A Brief Survey
The models we have in mind here are the rational choice ones of neoclassical micro-
economics. These are idealized in that they posit perfectly rational agents never 
seen in real life, and in many other ways too. There exist a number of  philosophical 
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accounts of such models. (See Frigg and Hartmann 2006 for a general inventory of 
types of models in science.) The accounts we shall consider here focus on answer-
ing two questions: what sorts of claims do these models make? And how do these 
claims fi gure in the interventions (and explanations) that we might design on the 
basis of these models? In other words, what does the spectrum auction tell us about 
how, in cases of true success, economic models really work? Shortly, we shall review 
four such accounts.
It is important to distinguish these questions from others that philosophers of 
science have been concerned about, such as what kind of objects models are, how 
they represent, how they relate to theory, and more. Take for instance the debate 
about how models represent the world. Various accounts have been proposed: 
models have been said to represent by virtue of isomorphism (van Fraassen 1980), 
partial isomorphism (Da Costa & French 2003), similarity (Giere 1988), by generat-
ing inferences (Suarez 2004), or by satisfying descriptions (Frigg 2006). Interesting 
though the issue is, we do not think that a correct account of representation would 
answer the questions we are concerned about here. To illustrate why not, let us 
take a closer look at one of the accounts just mentioned—the partial isomorphism 
view, as recently defended by Newton Da Costa and Steven French (2003).
Partial Structures
According to the classic structuralist view, a model is a structure of the form {A, 
R
i
}
ι∈Ι, where A is a set of individuals in a given domain of knowledge and the Ri 
comprise a family of relations defi ned on A. In Tarski’s schema, models provide 
interpretations of a language and we may talk about the truth of a sentence of 
this language by reference to a model that the sentence satisfi es. Using this frame-
work, philosophers of science have represented scientifi c theories by the structures 
or models that the linguistic formulations of those theories satisfy. Da Costa and 
French amend this idea in order to incorporate the incomplete and imperfect 
nature of scientifi c knowledge. To this end, they propose the notion of a partial 
structure, in which an n-place relation R
i
 is not necessarily defi ned for all n-tuples 
of elements in A. Then, such structures are true only of part of the domain that they 
model. The relationship between models and the world (the latter understood as a 
model of the true theory) is understood in terms of “relevant structural relation-
ships, suitably weakened to include the more plausible similarity, rather than strict 
identity, and suitably broadened to cover similarities in both formal and material 
properties” (Da Costa & French 2003, 48). They dub such relationships partial iso-
morphism: One partial structure is partially isomorphic to another when certain 
relationships in the fi rst structure stand in one-to-one correspondence to certain 
relationships of the second structure.
Da Costa and French take this framework to provide “an overarching account 
of models in science” (48). In their view, the notion of partial isomorphism can 
make sense of the use of idealization and approximation, the representative and 
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heuristic functions of models, the autonomy of models from theories, and scien-
tists’ attitude toward models of partial or pragmatic acceptance.
Regardless of whether their account succeeds in these purposes, we do not 
think it succeeds in answering the questions we are interested in here. If economic 
models are to be represented by partial structures, then we need some account of 
how these partial structures are applied for explanation and intervention. More 
specifi cally, even if we grant that an auction model is partially isomorphic with 
reality, that fact is not very helpful in itself; such a model may still be dramati-
cally inapplicable to the real world situations to which it is partially isomorphic, 
because there may be isomorphisms that do not tell us anything about the key 
processes involved. We need something extra to license interventions, that is, to 
distinguish between models that are useful and those that aren’t. The critical ques-
tion is whether a model is isomorphic to the part of the reality that actually mat-
ters. Da Costa and French’s scheme does not tell us how to fi nd out.
Credible Worlds
Another recent account views models as credible worlds (Sugden 2000, Gruene-
Yanoff 2007). More particularly, and contrary to the Hausman satisfaction-of-
assumptions account (see later), it denies that a model’s assumptions describe the 
conditions under which causal relations hold in the world. Robert Sugden, in par-
ticular, worries that Hausman’s logic is too restrictive because under it “we end 
up removing almost all empirical content from the implications of the models” 
(Sugden 2000, 17). Instead, economists’ claims start to look like abstract theo-
rems—if assumption 1, assumption 2, . . . , assumption n are true, then such-and-such 
result follows. But this is not how economists treat the conclusions of their models. 
Rather, they treat those models as making claims about the causal impact of one 
variable on another, holding fi xed everything else. By itself, this is not a novel read-
ing of models; what is novel is rather the justifi cation that Sugden offers for it.
This justifi cation lies in the notion of a credible world. A model is a sketch 
of a credible world to “the extent to which we can understand the relevant model 
as a description of how the world could be” (Sugden 2000, 24, original italics). 
Modelers construct imaginary worlds in which certain causal relations are shown 
to hold. To the extent that these relations cohere with our sense of how the actual 
world works, we come to view the world in the model as credible. A model is thus 
not a simplifi cation of the existing world, but rather a parallel reality.
Unfortunately, the details of the account are unsatisfactorily underspeci-
fi ed. (Sugden notably does not connect it at all with the standard literature on the 
metaphysics of possible worlds.) Thus, for instance, how do we judge a world’s 
credibility? Presumably, via background knowledge. But if so, judgments of cred-
ibility could not take us very far, in particular they could not take us beyond our 
background knowledge. In the case of the spectrum auction, nobody’s background 
knowledge could have told us which design would best distribute spectrum 
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licenses. Of course, we can and do use judgments of credibility to decide which 
hypotheses we might admit into a pool of hypotheses to consider. But that is very 
far from showing that a particular piece of model-based knowledge is explanatory 
or is a reliable justifi cation for policy. In the actual design of the auction, that cru-
cial extra step required active experimental investigation, as we shall see, not mere 
informal judgments of credibility.
We conclude that the credible worlds view, although inspired specifi cally by 
microeconomic models and seeking to describe the conditions under which we 
can have confi dence in them, turns out not to answer the questions that we are 
posing. It either fails to explain what makes models suitable bases for explanation 
and intervention, or else does not have that aim in the fi rst place. However, there 
are other philosophical accounts of models that do clearly have that aim and that 
do give explicit answers regarding it. So we move on now to those.
Satisfaction of Assumptions
The fi rst answer to these questions comes from an elaboration of the semantic view 
of theories defended by Ronald Giere (1988) and Daniel Hausman (1992). Hausman, 
applying the framework to economics, would argue that the equations in auction 
models, for instance, do not by themselves make empirical claims. Rather, they 
supply mere defi nitions, relating one mathematical entity to another. They only 
relate to the world via an additional hypothesis, namely that a real-world system 
satisfi es some relevant class of the model’s assumptions (Hausman 1992, 74–77). 
(A similar view of application appears to be endorsed by Morgan 2002.)
To see how this works, consider a standard auction theory model—say, one 
that claims that fi rst-price auctions lead to bids lower than bidders’ true valuations. 
To use this model to explain an actual fi rst-price auction for, say, artwork, fi rst 
the target system must satisfy the assumption that the auction is fi rst-price. But 
that alone is not enough, because the model has many other assumptions, too, for 
instance that bidder’s valuations have the right kind of statistical distribution, that 
bidders play according to Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that bidders are identical 
save for their valuations, etc. Should we, therefore, require that all the assumptions 
necessary for the derivation of the given result (i.e., bids below true valuation) 
be satisfi ed by the target system? This seems much too strict. No actual auction 
satisfi es all the assumptions of a game theory model, for example, the assumption 
of perfect rationality. Rather, we need a criterion for distinguishing the relevant 
assumptions from the irrelevant ones.
One such criterion is supplied by the de-idealization approach (McMullin 
1985). An assumption may be handled in two ways. First, the real-world system 
may satisfy it. Second, if it does not, then de-idealize by replacing the assumption 
with a more realistic one, while still preserving (to some degree) the predictions 
of the model relevant to explaining the target phenomenon. For example, if we 
have reason to believe that the real bidders are risk averse but our model assumes 
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risk neutrality, then we add risk aversion into our model and check whether the 
derivation still holds. If it does, then the de-idealization process is successful and 
the model’s result applies.
In such happy cases, we have the warrant to move from a claim in a model to a 
claim about a real-world target system. The fundamental problem with the strategy, 
however, is that, at least as far as economics is concerned, such happy cases may be 
hard to come by. In particular, problems arise when an assumption is not satisfi ed 
by the real-world system and yet cannot be relaxed, on pain of the model’s deriva-
tion failing or on pain of us not being able to solve the model at all. For instance, 
in the actual spectrum auctions, bidders were not perfectly rational but all models 
assumed they were; hundreds of licenses were on sale, but there were hardly any 
multi-unit auction models at the time; models assumed no budget constraints, but 
real bidders most probably had those; and so on. Yet for none of these assumptions 
was de-idealization feasible. It was simply not possible, at least at the time, to build 
a model incorporating more realistic versions of the assumptions and to check the 
effect of these changes on the models’ predictions. Indeed there simply was no one 
theoretical model capable of representing the actual auction as a whole, even at a 
very abstract level. This was known very well by the auction designers, who, as a 
result, had to use models in a more piecemeal manner, to be explained later.
Of course, the Hausman/McMullin account of model application may work 
better in other contexts. And, even in the case of auctions, we do know how 
to de-idealize some assumptions. But the important point for now is that de-
 idealization does not capture all that was actually going on in the spectrum auc-
tion design. A piece of the story is still missing.
Capacities
The last account is explicitly causal. On its view, models make claims about ten-
dencies or capacities, notions proposed originally by John Stuart Mill (1843) and 
more recently elaborated by Nancy Cartwright (1989, 1998). For example, when 
we say that negatively charged bodies have the capacity to make other negatively 
charged bodies move away, we mean that they make others move away even in the 
presence of disturbing factors. Auction models, on this view, are built in order to 
investigate the canonical behavior of a capacity, that is, its operation in its pure 
form in the absence of interferences. (Cartwright 1999). (A similar reading of eco-
nomic models in terms of isolations is endorsed by Maki 1992.) For example, on 
the basis of a model,we may conclude that a fi rst-price auction has the capacity to 
lower bids under the conditions of private values.
How might such models be applied? Following Polish philosopher Leszek 
Nowak, Cartwright argues that this occurs via a process of concretization. This 
involves adding back the factors (i.e., other capacities and disturbing factors) 
omitted by the model but present in the real-world situation. Unlike the previous 
account, concretization does not require that a model’s assumptions be satisfi ed by 
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the target situation for it to explain some feature of it. Capacities are supposed to 
be stable enough to allow us to move from what is true in a model to what is true 
in the real world. Of course, the various factors we introduce during concretization 
must correctly describe the disturbing factors. In particular, this means that de-
idealization in the sense described earlier, although admissible, is not necessary. 
Concretization can proceed by correcting the model in accordance with our back-
ground causal knowledge in ways other than by construction of a great big model. 
Indeed, at some point we should expect theoretical tools to run out. For example, 
low-level facts that form no part of any theory, such as how different materials 
react to each other, prove necessary to correct theoretical models when construct-
ing a laser (Cartwright 1989).
As we’ll see shortly, the spectrum auction design required much more than 
theory. Knowledge of extratheoretical practicalities proved crucial, which tells in 
favor of Cartwright’s concretization account. But it must still be demonstrated 
that economic models indeed supply genuine capacity claims, and this is a tough 
test to pass. Capacities, at least within a certain range of circumstances, are 
supposed to have stability in the face of other factors. That is, they are always 
‘attempting’ to manifest themselves even when—because of disturbing fac-
tors—they do not actually do so. (For our purposes, we may ignore metaphysi-
cal qualms over the nature of this attempting, which is rooted in Cartwright’s 
ontology of causal powers.) Yet, again as we’ll see, that was certainly not the 
experience of the auction designers. Instead, they found interactions between 
causal factors more often than not, meaning that the postulated capacities were 
no longer operational, that is, they were no longer even attempting to manifest 
themselves. Consequently, the designers believed that the stability of causes was 
a poor working hypothesis.
More generally, in many contexts in special sciences, such as economics and 
biology, the stability of causal relations is precisely what is in question and cannot 
simply be assumed. (For more on whether there are capacities in economics, see 
Reiss, forthcoming.) And yet, even in such contexts, often theory can still be suc-
cessfully applied. This suggests that something more is going on than is captured 
by the capacities account. We return to what that might be in Section 4. But fi rst, it 
is time to tell the story of the spectrum auction in more detail.
3. The Story of the Spectrum Auction
Political Background
The radio spectrum is the portion of electromagnetic spectrum between 9 kilohertz 
and 300 gigahertz. Spectrum not needed for governmental purposes is distributed 
via licenses by the FCC. For a long time, most of these licenses were awarded on the 
Harold Ch11.indd   312 10/25/2008   5:14:51 PM
progress in economics  313
UNCORRECTED PROOF
basis of hearings in which potential users had to demonstrate the public interest of 
their proposed enterprise. Because these had tended to become highly politicized, 
in the 1980s Congress authorized the use of lotteries instead. Then, in 1993, the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act gave the FCC the right to use competitive 
market mechanisms such as auctions.
When taking offi ce in 1992, Vice-President Al Gore viewed communications 
policy as key to his broader objectives. These were no less than to bring about 
an information revolution: deregulate the communications market, and thereby 
jump-start innovative technologies capable of bringing about genuine social 
change and empowerment. For instance, in one episode, the recently appointed 
FCC chairman Reed Hundt was in all seriousness lecturing Gerry Adams, the 
leader of the Irish republican party Sinn Fein (who had come to the United States 
hoping to have a meeting with Gore but instead had to make do with Hundt), that 
the Internet and cellular phones could bring peace to Northern Ireland (Hundt 
2000). Less idealistically, Gore’s team also saw an opportunity to weaken the big 
communications fi rms, who traditionally had been large Republican donors, by 
deregulating in such a way as to let new entrants take some of the industry’s mar-
ket share.
By the time the auctions were fi nally authorized by Congress, the Clinton 
administration was under siege, faced with Newt Gingrich’s 1994 revolution in the 
House. The stakes were, thus, extremely high. If the auctions failed, the adminis-
tration would lose credibility with regard to its communications policy and, with 
it, lose its ability to resist Congress. The FCC, as well as having to rethink its whole 
approach to spectrum distribution, would lose its bargaining power to extract 
concessions from the industry. In addition to the political stakes, there was also 
the considerable fi nancial stake of the potential billions of dollars that could be 
raised for taxpayers.
Why Auction Design Matters
The best way to appreciate the importance of good auction design is to see what 
happens in its absence. In the early 1990s, the New Zealand government adopted a 
second-price design with no reserve price (i.e., no minimum bid). The results were 
deeply embarrassing because the high value of the licenses was widely known and 
publicized and yet the government ended up earning very little. Most notoriously, 
an Otago university student won a license for a small-town TV station by bidding 
just $5, actually paying nothing since nobody else submitted a bid. In Australia, 
the 1993 auction for satellite television licenses was a fi rst-price sealed-bid auction, 
but with no deposit and no specifi c payment policy. An unknown outbid the big 
players such as Rupert Murdoch (which the government initially gave a good spin 
to), only to default on the payment with no punishment whatsoever (for which no 
good spin was available). A series of after-auction resales followed, which delayed 
the introduction of paid television for nearly a year (McMillan 1994).
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More recently, Switzerland offered four licenses for sale in 2000 in an ascend-
ing auction and initially attracted nine bidders. However, the weaker bidders were 
put off by the competition from the incumbents, and, in addition to that, the gov-
ernment also allowed joint-bidding agreements, which gave two companies the 
right to agree on which license they’d each settle without raising the price for each 
other—“offi cially-sanctioned collusion” in the words of Klemperer (2002a, 835). In 
the end, right before the auction, the number of bidders shrank to four, and it was 
looking increasingly likely that the four bidders would just pay the very low reserve 
prices. So the government tried to postpone the auction, only to be taken to court 
because it had not specifi ed beforehand the right to cancel an auction in these cir-
cumstances. As a result, valuable licenses in one of the richest countries in Europe 
went for one-fi fteenth of what the government had hoped (Wolfstetter 2003).
In contrast, the FCC’s series of seven auctions from 1994 to 1996 were a remark-
able success. They attracted many bidders, allocated several thousand licenses, 
and raised an inordinate amount of money—$20 billion—that surpassed all gov-
ernment and industry expectations (Cramton 1998). Even the fi rst auctions went 
without a glitch and gave Reed Hundt the photo-opportunity of a lifetime when 
in front of TV cameras he presented to Bill Clinton a giant check made out to 
“American taxpayers” (Hundt 2000). The auctions’ effi ciency is harder to judge, 
partly because it is hard to observe bidders’ valuations and hence hard to ascer-
tain that the licenses went to those who valued them most. However, one posi-
tive sign is that similar licenses sold for approximately similar prices, suggesting 
that they were likely the market prices. Another is that many bidders were able, 
as desired, to purchase aggregations of licenses consistent with geographic syner-
gies. Finally, there was little resale in the years following the auctions, which sug-
gests that bidders still valued the licenses they purchased (Cramton 1998, 2006).1 
(Experimenters were also able to provide independent evidence of the auction’s 
effi ciency—see later.)
The Actual FCC Design
In the academic literature, the idea of using auctions to assign spectrum property 
rights dates from the 1950s (Herzel 1998, Coase 1998). The literature was revolu-
tionized in the 1980s by a new generation of auction designs based on game theory. 
Nowadays, auctions have become a standard tool. Economic journals have pub-
lished special issues on spectrum auctions (Journal of Law and Economics XLI (2) 
October 1998, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6, 1997), and the FCC 
hosts conferences in which economists discuss which designs are preferable for 
what purposes and what environments. The FCC Web site itself hosts records of 
papers and presentations on the topic by eminent scholars.
There was wide participation of economic theorists and experimentalists 
in the 1994 auction design. Several months in advance, the FCC solicited public 
comments. Many academics, hired either by prospective bidders or by the FCC 
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itself, responded with recommendations. The constraints were set by govern-
ment requirements: effi cient and intensive use of the spectrum; promotion of new 
technologies; prevention of excessive concentration of licenses; and ensuring that 
some licenses go to favored bidders such as minority- and women-owned compa-
nies, small businesses, and rural telephone companies (McMillan 1994). Exactly 
what rules would reliably produce the desired outcome was a formidable puzzle 
for teams of economic theorists, experimentalists, lawyers, software engineers and 
policy makers.
To give a fl avor of the intricacy of the fi nal design, consider fi rst that geo-
graphically the country was subdivided into 51 major trading areas, which in turn 
were subdivided into 492 basic trading areas, each of which had four spectrum 
blocks up for license. The auction mechanism fi nally selected was a simultane-
ous multiround auction. It put all licenses for sale simultaneously, as opposed to 
sequentially, and in an open rather than sealed-bid arrangement. Bidders placed 
bids on individual, as opposed to packages of, licenses they were interested in, and 
when a round was over, they saw what other bids had been placed. Then, the next 
round began, in which bidders were free to change the original combinations of 
licenses but had to increase their bid up to the level of the highest previous round 
bid plus a prescribed increment if they wished to hold on to a license. The process 
continued until no more bids on any license were received.
The bidding was regulated by a number of further rules:
—Activity Rules: a bidder had to maintain a certain level of activity during 
each round, on pain of reduced eligibility in subsequent rounds. However, 
each bidder also got fi ve waivers that allowed them to take advantage of 
fi ve opportunities not to place a bid on a particular license in a round.
—Minimum Bid Requirement: between rounds, the auctioneer specifi ed the 
minimum bid increment (between 5 and 20 percent). The exact increment 
chosen depended on bidders’ behavior—the more bidding, the larger the 
increment.
—Designated Entities: companies owned by women, minorities, and/or small 
businesses, got 10–40 percent credits on specifi c licenses.
—Spectrum Cap: no fi rm could own more than 45MHz of spectrum in any 
geographical area, hence could not bid on more than the corresponding 
number of licenses.
—Payment Rules: the FCC required an upfront payment from which 
penalties were deducted if the bidder withdrew, or which got refunded if 
the bidder failed to win the license they were bidding for.
This is a very brief summary. The full statement of the auction rules takes over 
130 pages (FCC 1994b). By rules, we mean the explicit and public instructions cov-
ering entry, bidding, and payment that all participants received and studied before 
the auction. But, as we shall see, in addition much work also had to be put into per-
fecting the precise material environment, that is, features such as the software, the 
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venue and timing of the auction, and whatever aspects of the legal and economic 
environment the designers could control.
The critical question for us is what justifi ed this fi nal complex design—why this 
design rather than another? It would be convenient if the methodology could be read 
off uncontroversially from what the actors involved said and did, but matters are not 
so simple. This is not surprising given that the auctions were a hugely sensitive phe-
nomenon that put at stake the fortunes of the FCC, the Clinton administration, and 
the telecoms industry, as well as the reputations of many economists. Two main com-
peting accounts emerge—roughly, those of theorists and those of experimentalists.
The Theorists’ View
John McMillan and Preston McAfee were economic theorists, at the time working, 
respectively, at University of California–San Diego and University of Texas–Austin, 
who became actively involved in the FCC auction design. McMillan was hired by 
the FCC itself, McAfee by the potential bidder Airtouch Communications. They 
are also the infl uential authors of the fi rst two articles dedicated wholly to the FCC 
spectrum auctions, which appeared in the Journal of Economic Perspectives in sum-
mer 1994 and then winter 1996.
What is interesting about their version of the story is its emphasis on the role 
played by theory in settling the major design questions, and, hence, the conclusion 
that game theory deserves the major credit for the auction’s success. The fi rst para-
graph of their joint article “Analyzing the Airwaves Auction” reveals this attitude: 
“Just as the Nobel committee was recognizing game theory’s role in economics by 
awarding the 1994 prize to John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, game 
theory was being put to its biggest use ever.” They quote Fortune describing the 
auctions as the “most dramatic example of game theory’s new power . . . It was a 
triumph, not only for the FCC and the taxpayers, but also for game theory (and 
game theorists).” Further on, Forbes is quoted again: “Game theory, long an intel-
lectual pastime, came into its own as a business tool,” as is the Wall Street Journal: 
“Game theory is hot” (all citations from McAfee and McMillan 1996, 159). What 
exactly was hot about game theory, according to McAfee and McMillan, was that 
the FCC “chose an innovative form of auction over the time-tested alternatives 
(like a sealed-bid auction), because theorists predicted it would induce more com-
petitive bidding and a better match of licenses to fi rms” (1996, our italics).2
This is not to say that McAfee and McMillan accord all the epistemic credit to 
theory. Rather, on their account, various judgment calls were also required. Some 
examples of particular design issues will make clear their exact position:
Open or Sealed-Bid? Theory suggests that an open auction, that is, one 
in which all bids are public, reassures bidders that they have not 
overestimated a license’s value because the other bids give information 
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about rivals’ evaluations. An open auction, therefore, should reduce 
bidders’ fear of the winner’s curse—the phenomenon in which the 
winning bid is the one that most overestimates the value of the object for 
sale. Therefore, an open auction should raise more revenue. However, 
other theory argues against open auctions, for example, because their 
greater information fl ow also makes undesirable bidder collusion easier 
and, thus, revenue lower. Therefore, theoretical advice was ambiguous, 
identifying two effects but not specifying which is the strongest. Which 
way to go, open or sealed bid? In the end, the designers chose an open 
auction. McMillan explains that the decision required a judgment call 
rather than a neat theoretical demonstration, but does not explain in any 
detail on what basis that judgment call was made.
Simultaneous or Sequential? Should all licenses be offered simultaneously, or 
instead auctioned off one by one, that is, sequentially? McMillan explains 
that the “debate pitted theoretical virtues against practical feasibility” 
(1994, 153). When several items are up for auction, the usual practice 
is to sell them sequentially. However, in the case of spectrum licenses, 
aggregation is important—companies wanted clusters of licenses that 
would work effi ciently together. If these licenses were sold sequentially, a 
bidder would have to make guesses about the future prices of other licenses 
when bidding for current ones. Such uncertainty impacts not only on 
revenue raised but also on whether licenses get distributed effi ciently, that 
is, to those who value them most.
These considerations argue in favor of a simultaneous auction. However, 
just imagine what it would be like to have literally thousands of licenses 
all up for sale at the same time! Would bidders be able to track an auction 
of such gigantic proportions? Would they be able to process that much 
information simultaneously? What if a small attention slip or clerical error 
turned into a disaster worthy of a court battle? Finally, would such an 
auction ever come to a stop?
To deal with these reasonable practical concerns while still holding on to the 
advantages of the simultaneous mechanism, the auction designers devised 
stopping rules and penalties for withdrawing bids. As for concerns about 
complexity, McMillan tells us, auction designers judged the problem 
manageable and hoped for the best.
Packages or Individual? Should bids for packages of licenses, as opposed 
to bids for individual licenses, be allowed? One argument in favor is 
complementarity. Two or more licenses are complementary if owning 
one increases the value of other. For example, a company might value a 
Minneapolis license higher if it already owns Chicago rather than Atlanta. 
McMillan explains that it is easier to develop a customer base in adjacent 
geographical areas, to manage interferences, to establish roaming, and 
so on (1994, 150). The problem is that theory supports both package and 
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individual bids, depending on the extent of complementarities, yet the 
exact extent of those was unknown. So arguments from sources other than 
theory must account for the adoption of one design rather than the other. 
In the end, package bidding was disallowed. (It is still offi cially considered 
by the FCC to be an option—it is listed as one of the two offi cial auction 
designs on its Web site—but in the actual auction it was never permitted.)
Overall, when we look at the details, we can see the strength of McMillan’s 
own admission that “theory has limits” (McMillan 1994, 151). Apart from anything 
else, none of the relevant models was remotely a model of the complete auction 
that the FCC was seeking to design. It is not clear that theory did any more than 
suggest possible issues for designers to take into account. This is no small contri-
bution—but it does still leave one crucial factor unclear. Although we learn about 
the practical considerations and resultant judgment calls that were in play, we get 
no sense of what exactly justifi ed those particular judgment calls that were eventu-
ally made.
The Experimentalists’ View
We turn next to a very different perspective. Charles Plott, a prominent experi-
mental economist from Caltech, worked on the FCC auctions from fall 1993 
through the fall of 1994. He recounts his experience in Plott 1997. In experimental 
economics, laboratory environments are used to study people’s decision-making 
processes. Many aspects of these environments, such as the subjects’ characteris-
tics, the information they receive, the rules within which they act, and so on, may 
be very carefully controlled. Such environments—or, as Plott calls them, experi-
mental test beds—are treated as prototypes of more complex real-life economic 
situations. The test beds played many roles in the auction design. One was precisely 
to provide grounds (albeit retrospective ones) for the sort of judgment calls that 
McMillan talks about.
Initially, the experimental test beds were used to test broad aspects of the auction 
rules. Sometimes it was discovered that outcomes were very sensitive to unexpected 
features. For instance, in a sealed-bid auction in which the price is rising continu-
ously and bidders drop out until only one remains, bidders had a tendency to stay 
in, rather than drop out, just to drive up the price for the competitor, even though 
this entails the risk of winning an unwanted item. The interesting fact is that the 
bubble created in this way is even bigger when bidders have access to information 
that rivals are still “in.” Plott says that there “seems to be no theoretical foundation 
for this phenomenon, since expectations of the actions of others could cause the 
same behavior. Nevertheless, in experiments with the information removed such 
bubbles were less pronounced if they existed at all” (1997, 620, note 1).
In other words, experiment revealed something that could not have been 
known just from theory. Perhaps even more importantly for our purposes, Plott 
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emphasizes that it also revealed “the sensitivity of the behavioral characteristics of 
the auction process to the environment in which it might be operating” (1997, 621). 
For instance, with regard to the bubble behavior just mentioned:
Even if the information is not offi cially available as part of the organized 
auction, the procedures may be such that it can be inferred. For example, if all 
bidders are in the same room, and if exit from the auction is accompanied by 
a click of a key or a blink of a screen, or any number of other subtle sources of 
information, such bubbles might exist even when efforts are made to prevent 
them. The discovery of such phenomena underscores the need to study the 
operational details of auctions (Plott 1997, 620)
Another example of these problems was interactive effects. Experiments 
showed that the impact of any particular auction rule tended to be dependent both 
on which other rules were included, and also on the details of the implementation. 
Theory alone was typically unable to predict these interactive effects, even those 
with respect just to other rules. So at later stages of auction design, experimental 
test beds were crucial to overcoming the diffi culty. In Plott’s phrase, the test beds 
enabled the “development and implementation of auction technology” (1997, 627). 
By “technology” he does not just mean the software that implemented the auction 
electronically. Rather, he means the overall set of rules governing bidding, activ-
ity, stopping, and so forth, and the material conditions such as the software. The 
experiments run at this stage enabled researchers to develop one technology, that 
is, one set of rules plus material environment, designed to generate the outcome 
desired by the FCC regarding speed, effi ciency, income generation, and so on.
Plott’s account shows the holistic nature of the auction design process. 
Individual rules do not have a stable effect across different environments, so the 
performance of any particular set of rules must be tested as a package, and moreover 
tested anew with every signifi cant change in environment. This process of trying 
out different “wholes” was accomplished by a three-stage system of testing (Plott 
1997, 630–631). First, Caltech undergraduates with experimentally induced prefer-
ences participated in auctions using the actual FCC software. Second, to make sure 
that the success of these mock auctions was not an accident, researchers then hired 
the same students to look for ways to derail the auction by various devious moves 
within the software (for example, withdraw but then start bidding again), in a 
process called debugging The students were paid for keeping diaries about their 
experience of playing the auction. Third, researchers implemented parallel check-
ing, in which a program was fed the data from the experimental auctions and, on 
the basis of this data, it performed all the computations that the FCC program was 
to do. This allowed them to check the accuracy of the FCC programming and to 
reverse engineer the system when problems were discovered. The result of all this 
was the perfection of one piece of technology, that is, of one material environment 
in which the auction rules operated more or less as desired.
Therefore, it was not the case that the key design decisions were fi rst made by 
theorists, and that the software was then developed to implement these decisions 
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only afterwards. Rather, the two issues had to be settled simultaneously because, as 
the experiments showed, they were not independent of each other. (It is true though 
that Plott’s team did not have total freedom here, because, by the time of the later 
experiments, the broad aspects of the auction design—for example that it would be 
open and disallow package bids—were decided.)
Next, the experimenters applied their understanding in the fi eld, that is, at the 
actual auction itself. Plott was a member of the increment committee created by 
the FCC whose purpose was to advise on possible interventions into the fi rst auc-
tion, held in July 1994. The FCC had reserved the right to intervene, for instance by 
speeding up rounds. Plott’s team knew that the intervals between rounds did not 
make much of a difference to the effi ciency of the design, so the increment commit-
tee was free to vary the length of the intervals (1997, 632–633). Thus, another func-
tion of the experiments was to teach researchers some of the ways in which it would 
be safe to perturb the fi nal auction design.
The experimenters’ final function was to check that the actual auction was 
running efficiently. In the laboratory, auction preferences are induced, that is, 
controlled by the experimenter. Subjects each receive a piece of paper informing 
them how much they are willing to pay for a license. This means that, at the end 
of such a mock auction, the experimenters are able to check whether the final 
price reached is an equilibrium price, that is, whether the winner is the bid-
der with the highest valuation. But in real auctions, this is impossible because 
bidders’ preferences are unknown to outsiders. Francesco Guala explains how, 
nevertheless, it was possible to get some indication of whether the auction was 
efficient (Guala 2005). Prior to the real auction, a number of laboratory auc-
tions were run that approximated its parameters as much as possible. Those 
parameters included the number of items for sale, rules, valuations (or guesses 
thereof), the extent of complementarities (or guesses thereof), and so on. The 
data from these auctions, such as their duration, price movements, existence 
of bubbles, and such, were meticulously collected. Similar data were then col-
lected, during the real auction, and compared to the laboratory data. Since the 
price trajectories achieved were very similar and since the laboratory prices 
were efficient, researchers were able to make an argument that the real auction 
prices were efficient too.
Lessons From the Spectrum Auction
How well do the four accounts of models face up to this detailed history? As noted 
earlier, unfortunately it seems that neither invoking a partial isomorphism between 
model and world, nor invoking the credibility of a model’s world, sheds light on 
how the auction mechanism was constructed, nor on why it rather than some alter-
native mechanism was preferable. We shall reaffi rm now why neither the satisfac-
tion-of-assumptions nor the capacities accounts can do the job either, or at least 
why neither can give any more than an incomplete picture.
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The theorists’ and experimentalists’ views emphasize different methods for giv-
ing warrant to the particular auction design adopted by the FCC. McMillan’s narra-
tive is most naturally read as endorsing the method of concretization, while Plott’s, 
at least in part, isn’t. Plott’s narrative, however, is more successful at showing that the 
decisions that ended up being taken by auction designers were justifi ed. So concreti-
zation does not seem to capture the true methodology of the auction design.
McMillan’s history emphasizes the claim that the success of the FCC auctions con-
sisted in the proper deployment of theoretical resources. Theoretical models allowed 
us to learn that open auctions encourage the fl ow of information, thereby reducing the 
winner’s curse and increasing revenue; that package bids can be ineffi cient; that simul-
taneous auctions favor effi cient distributions; and so on. The notion of capacity fi ts 
these claims nicely. For McMillan, theoretical results give us facts that are stable enough 
to employ for interventions, explanations, and predictions. At least sometimes, theo-
retical facts wear their policy implications on their sleeve. Thus the FCC auction design 
was successful because it harnessed the capacities of different design features properly.
Notice fi rst that, contrary to the Hausman/McMullin satisfaction-of-assump-
tions account, this was not achieved by means of de-idealization. Assumptions in the 
auction models typically included, for instance, perfect rationality, no budget con-
straints on bidders, single units (as opposed to hundreds of spectrum licenses simul-
taneously on sale), and so forth. These assumptions were critical to the derivation of 
the models’ results, yet no one had a model that yielded the consequences of relax-
ing these assumptions. Thus, as noted in Section 2, de-idealization was not feasible. 
Moreover, in the case of some other assumptions, even when a de-idealized theoreti-
cal treatment was available, the results were often discouraging, for example, prov-
ing that no competitive equilibrium is possible. All this, therefore, tells against the 
Hausman/McMullin account of model application being the full story in this case.
Since the language of capacities fi ts McMillan’s own description of the theo-
retical arguments, turn lastly to the Cartwright/Nowak method of concretization. 
In the case of the auction, this would essentially amount to the process of com-
bining together design features (i.e. auction rules) that have different capacities, in 
such a way as to ensure that the outcome is the one we want. This does seem to fi t 
McMillan’s history very well. For instance, simultaneous bidding, which is valued 
for its effi ciency, also has the capacity to generate chaos by being too complex and 
by causing the auction to last too long. So we supplement it with various bidding 
and stopping rules that would prevent these effects.
Something like this story probably was the basis for constructing the mock auc-
tions used initially by Plott’s team. But a reason to include some rule in a preliminary 
test auction is not the same as a reason to include it in the fi nal auction itself. In the 
fi rst context we need only a defeasible reason, while in the second we need a solid jus-
tifi cation. Plott reminds us again and again that experiments demonstrated interac-
tions between different rules, in turn making it hard to draw any conclusions based 
only on models that understandably excluded messy real-world features, such as soft-
ware details and small variations in rules. This is precisely what the  experiments were 
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for—they worked to reduce the uncertainty created by the interactions by revealing 
a single material environment in which the auction worked as desired. These are 
the experiments that supplied the needed justifi cation for one design over another. 
Because of the interactions, Plott treats the material environments as wholes in which 
all elements together produce the result. No single feature of these environments on 
its own, such as the open design, can be said to be responsible for it.
This aspect of Plott’s methodology suggests skepticism even about the capac-
ities account. For example, while McMillan credits the open auction design with 
reducing the winner’s curse effect, Plott remained entirely agnostic about how 
the winner’s curse plays out when complementarities are in place (Plott 1997, 
626). At the time, no model that incorporated complementarities even existed. 
In the experiments, more features were added specifi cally to defeat the winner’s 
curse, namely, fl exible minimum increments that made it more attractive to bid 
when activity was low, and also activity rules that required bidders to submit bids 
on pain of losing their eligibility. This does not demonstrate that the theoreti-
cal result was not taken seriously, but it does show that further justifi cation was 
needed. Designers could not trust that the capacity of an open auction to defeat 
the winner’s curse was stable enough to be relied on without further testing.
It would not be new to claim that theory alone cannot tell us the effects of fea-
tures in any actual auction. Work on the role of models by contributors to (Morgan 
& Morrison 1999), by Cartwright (1983, 1989), and by a number of other philoso-
phers of science, has already shown us how much extratheoretical knowledge is 
required to apply theory properly. However, Plott’s methodology suggests a stron-
ger conclusion: There was not even much knowledge of capacities at his disposal, 
and thus that the method of combination of causes was inapplicable. Regardless of 
whether auction designers did know any capacity claims, the methods they used 
to confi rm the right set of auction rules and software were not that of concretiza-
tion. For Plott, theoretical models were merely useful heuristics, generating cat-
egories in terms of which to start the design process. A new account of application 
is needed.
4. Models in Science Revisited: 
The Open-Formula View
Models as Open Formulas
How exactly does a model apply to a phenomenon, for example, when it yields its 
explanation? A common feature of the satisfaction-of-assumption and capacity 
accounts is that the recipe for identifying an explanatory claim involves the model 
itself in some essential way. On the former account, a model applies when some 
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set of its assumptions are satisfi ed, and the explanatory claim can be obtained 
from the model by appropriately de-idealizing it. On the latter, a model applies 
if the causes it describes occur in the target situation. The associated explana-
tory capacity claim is thus stated by the model. But why should we assume that a 
model should necessarily provide such information? It might do so, but perhaps it 
is too restrictive to make that a requirement. We shall now propose that a model 
sometimes serves a different function, namely, that of a framework or heuristic for 
formulating causal hypotheses, but where it is those latter hypotheses—distinct 
from the model—that are explanatory. (For more philosophical detail about this 
approach than there is space to give here, see Alexandrova, forthcoming.)
In the experimental test beds of the spectrum auction, game theory models of 
auctions were used as suggestions for developing causal hypotheses that could then 
be tested by experiment. One such hypothesis might be: When values are private and 
some other conditions hold, fi rst-price auction designs cause bids below true valuation. 
This hypothesis has the general form: Feature(s) F(s) cause behavior(s) B(s) under 
condition(s) C(s). Note that not all the model’s assumptions need appear in the specifi -
cation of conditions C(s). Rather, only those deemed salient are included. There is thus 
a distinction between such a causal hypothesis and the model proper. While the model 
plays an important role in formulating such a hypothesis, it does not fully specify it.
When a model is used in this way, we propose to conceive of it as an open for-
mula, that takes the form:
1. In a situation x with some characteristics that may or may not include 
{C
1
  . . . C
n
}, a certain feature F causes a certain behavior B.
where x is a variable, F and B are property names of, respectively, putative causes 
and effects in the model, and {C
1
 . . . C
n
} are the conditions under which Fs cause Bs 
in the model.3 It is important to distinguish this from another claim:
2. There exists a situation S with characteristics {C
1
 . . . C
n
}, such that in this 
situation a certain feature F causes a certain behavior B.
An open-formula 1, unlike an existential claim 2, makes no commitment 
about the existence of x, and does not make yet any claim about any situation 
under which Fs cause Bs since the features of x are not fully specifi ed. Rather, x is a 
free variable that needs to be fi lled in, in order for the open formula to make such 
a claim. Once x is specifi ed, we get a causal hypothesis of the form “an F causes a 
B in a situation S,” where S is characterized by some conditions C. Without closing 
the open formula by specifying x, 1 only gives us a template or a schema for a causal 
claim, rather than a fully fl edged causal claim such as 2.
Advantages of the Open-Formula Account
What are the advantages of this new reading of models? First, it still allows us 
to pursue the old readings—when we so wish. Formally, one set of conditions C 
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under which Fs cause Bs is just all of the model’s assumptions. So if we have evi-
dence to treat the model as a capacity claim or if we know how to de-idealize it, 
then we can use those methods. But we are also free to ignore some assumptions, 
and so in effect not to have to privilege the model’s formal assumptions over other 
extratheoretical conditions under which the causal hypothesis might hold.
Thus we now have license to go ahead and build many different causal claims 
on the basis of one model. This freedom is particularly important in the circum-
stances that often exist in institution design. In the spectrum auction, sometimes 
it was simply not known whether some assumption, essential to a derivation in the 
model, was satisfi ed in the real world. For instance, many models assumed facts 
about the statistical properties of the distributions of bidder valuations, such as 
their shape, uniformity, continuity, and so on. But designers dealing with actual 
bidders have no way of ascertaining these facts simply because companies keep 
their valuations secret. In a situation like that, designers could not use the assump-
tions of the model as a guide to specifying Cs. So they hoped to fi nd some other 
empirical conditions, not mentioned in the model, under which features F cause 
behaviors B.
Moreover, sometimes auction designers had no control over a condition C and 
so could not make the target system satisfy this assumption. This was the case 
with the assumption of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, for instance. Auction design-
ers knew that the fl esh and blood fi rst-time spectrum bidders they had to deal 
with in the actual auction could not be expected to have the sort of rationality that 
the models assumed. So allowances had to be made for lack of experience, for the 
fact that the auction was complex, and so on. In particular, new rules were added 
purely to push the bidders to behave as required to ensure effi ciency. Formally, 
again, some set of conditions C, other than the one specifi ed by the model, needed 
to be found in order to make Fs cause Bs in the real world.
Moreover, generally microeconomic models are often evaluated on their trac-
tability, elegance, and, of course, deductive closure. But whatever their merits for 
other purposes, we see now that such criteria do not necessarily give us any assur-
ance that a model explains and in fact may get in the way of explaining. They are 
thus all reasons that certain assumptions are included over and above the reason 
of merely stating the empirical conditions under which a result holds. In turn, this 
is why it often proves useful not to include such assumptions when formulating 
causal hypotheses about the real world.
These challenges indicate that we often cannot rely on models alone to tell us 
the vital conditions C. If so, then we need some other way. The open-formula view 
is set up precisely to accommodate the necessary contributions from beyond the-
ory. However, such fl exibility does not come free. For the older accounts, at least we 
have explicit procedures by which to guarantee that a causal claim derived from a 
model holds in the real world. More particularly, on the Giere/Hausman satisfac-
tion-of-assumptions view, a successful de-idealization gives us warrant to assert that 
if the original model established a causal claim, then the de-idealized one does, too. 
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Similarly, on the Mill/Cartwright capacity view, if a model makes a justifi ed capacity 
claim, then that claim will still be true outside the model, provided that we have con-
cretized successfully. In each case, if the original model tells us that an F causes a B 
in a situation S, then if the model also applies to a situation S* according to the rules 
of the account, then the warrant to claim that an F* causes a B* automatically travels 
from the model to S*. But on our open- formula view, such preservation of war-
rant cannot be sustained. Once we treat models merely as open formulas, the causal 
hypotheses we construct from them have to be confi rmed in some other way.
There is, thus, a trade-off—the open-formula view gives us free reign to pick 
and choose the assumptions from the model that will fi gure in the fi nal causal 
hypotheses we end up with, but the price is that we are left still needing a way to 
confi rm those hypotheses. Nothing about the procedure of their formation guar-
antees that they will in fact hold; rather, that must be established anew each time. 
We think that unfortunately this price is in any case unavoidable because neither 
of the alternatives—de-idealization and concretization—is likely, for the reasons 
discussed earlier, to be available in many cases. Nevertheless, it does mean that we 
must now address how open formulas may be applied.
From Open Formulas to Explanations
A causal explanation of a real-world phenomenon requires that we make a true and 
justifi ed claim about a real-world causal relation. With the open-formula account, 
we achieve this via a three-stage procedure:
Stage 1: Construct an open formula by picking from a model’s premises and 
conclusions the Fs and Bs of interest. These presumably will correspond 
to the putative causes and the putative effects at work in the real-world 
phenomenon of interest.
Stage 2: Fill in x so as to arrive at a closed formula, that is, a causal hypothesis 
of the form “Fs cause Bs under conditions C” where Fs and Bs match 
some aspects of the target situation. The conditions C may or may not be 
described by the original model’s assumptions.
Stage 3: Confi rm the causal hypothesis. We do that by fi nding a material 
realization of it, that is, a material environment in which an F indeed 
causes a B.
Stage 3 is obviously the diffi cult bit. That is why, in the case of the spectrum 
auction, so much work was needed in the experimental test beds. When we do 
achieve a material realization then we are entitled to say that the causal hypothesis 
inspired by the model is true, and, thus, that we have a causal explanation of B. 
The features of the environment in which the causal hypothesis is true are what 
allow us to fi ll in the open formula, that is to specify fully the conditions C under 
which an F causes a B. Part of this specifi cation may match the assumptions of the 
original model, but part of it may not.
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How are material realizations specifi ed? Answer: in the same way that we normally 
specify a claim about one set of suffi cient causes of a phenomenon. (In the terminol-
ogy of J.L. Mackie’s INUS conditions, a material realization for a causal relation can be 
understood as one of the disjuncts of the overall INUS formula.) Thus, we do not just 
blindly list every feature of the material situation, such as the color of the bidders’ eyes 
and so on. Rather, we only specify those conditions that are causally relevant.
Exactly what the conditions C must be like for Fs to cause Bs can be tricky to 
establish. We may test the causal relevance of Cs to Fs and Bs by drawing as convenient 
from the usual repertoire of methods—controlled trial, natural experiment, Mill’s 
methods and variations on them, mark methods, Bayes Nets, and so forth. Whatever 
story philosophers of science and methodologists tell about causal inference gener-
ally, will presumably help to clarify how we may fi ll in models’ open formulas.
This account of models, and of their application in terms of material realization, 
enables us to make sense of institution design. In particular, unlike the alternative 
accounts, it explains why the use of models in the design of the spectrum auction 
was justifi ed, even though neither de-idealization nor extrapolation on the basis of 
capacities was always available. According to this view, the models of auction theory 
supplied researchers with a number of partially fi lled-in open formulas: “First-price 
auctions cause bids below true valuations under conditions . . . ,” “Open auctions 
defeat the winner’s curse under conditions . . . ,” “Individual rather than package 
bids do not hinder effi cient distribution under conditions . . . ” and so forth. So at the 
beginning, there was a wide range of “F
i
 cause B
j
 in x” claims. After much work, what 
researchers ended up with was an explanation of the actual auction in the form:
3. A set of features {F
1
 . . . F
k
} causes a set of behaviors {B
1
 . . . B
m
} under a set 
of conditions {C
1
 . . . C
n
}.
where Fs stand for features of rules, Bs for aspects of the auction’s outcomes (i.e., 
its revenue generation, license distribution, speed, etc.) and Cs for the material con-
ditions that the designers could control. The Bs were partially specifi ed by the gov-
ernment. The trick was then to fi nd the combination of Fs and Cs that would bring 
about those Bs. Some of the Fs, Bs, and Cs fi gured in the models of auction theory, 
others came from different sources of knowledge. Crucially, it was the experimental 
test beds that allowed auction designers to fi nd one combination of rules and soft-
ware such that when this combination was instantiated, the particular kind of open 
auction selected did indeed cause a speedy and effi cient distribution of licenses.
5. Progress in Economics
At last, we are ready to turn to the question of progress in economics. Without the 
development of modern auction theory, the successful FCC auction design would 
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not have been possible. In addition, there has also accumulated crucial practi-
cal know-how, so that the designers of the United States spectrum auction did 
not repeat the mistakes of their New Zealand and Australian predecessors, for 
instance. This suggests two distinct senses in which the successful FCC auction 
reveals progress in economics—fi rst, purely theoretical development; and second, 
engineering development in how theory might be applied. Can both of these senses 
be sustained? The details of the auction case study now turn out to be very reveal-
ing. In particular, we shall argue, they endorse progress strictly only of the second 
engineering kind, in a manner to be explained. This has implications in turn for 
the role played in any progress by theoretical development, and, therefore, for just 
what it is about economic theory that we should value.
What Economic Progress is not
In order eventually to see the import of the spectrum auction case here, begin 
fi rst with a brief detour into the literature on scientifi c progress generally. This 
has traditionally analyzed progress in terms of scientifi c theories. In particular, 
from the beginning it has been motivated primarily by the debate between sci-
entifi c realism and antirealism. Because it is accepted that most, if not all, of our 
best theories are not literally true, a satisfactory account of approximate truth (or 
‘verisimilitude’) has been seen as important, perhaps even essential, to the realist 
position (Putnam 1975; Newton-Smith 1981; Miller 1987; Boyd 1990; Psillos 1999). 
Scientifi c progress has then been seen in terms of successive theories achieving 
closer and closer approximations to the truth—convergent realism. For example, 
the sequence of Aristotelean, Newtonian, and fi nally relativistic mechanics is seen 
as one such convergence.
It has proven notoriously diffi cult to fl esh out satisfactorily the needed notion 
of verisimilitude. One classic problem is language dependence: For any two false 
theories, any ranking of them by verisimilitude can be reversed simply by changing 
the choice of variables on which that ranking is defi ned (Miller 1974; Miller 1975). 
The problem is especially devastating because even were we to postulate a privi-
leged one-true ontology—perhaps the natural kinds as revealed by an ideal science 
for instance—still that ontology would underdetermine choice of variables. For 
this and other reasons, it is currently dubious whether any authoritative sense can 
be made of a false theory’s closeness to the truth. In turn, this has motivated some 
to be skeptical of global scientifi c progress at all (Laudan 1984).
This emphasis on realism and theories refl ects the literature’s concentration on 
fundamental physics and chemistry rather than the special sciences. For example, 
general relativity and quantum mechanics are plausibly taken to be literal descrip-
tions of the world, and thus as potential candidates for being true and for being 
interpreted realistically. Or at least, so many realists have believed. Other posi-
tions, too, such as Van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism, agree that such 
theories should be interpreted as literal descriptions. Theories in economics, by 
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contrast, are agreed by all to be extremely idealized. Nobody thinks that Homo 
economicus is a literally true description of anyone. So the idea that economic theo-
ries could ever be literally true is clearly a nonstarter.
Nevertheless, this still seems to leave open a different sense in which economic 
theory could be progressing, namely, that it is becoming better at capturing par-
ticular aspects of reality. In particular, the thought runs, although auction models, 
for instance, are idealized descriptions and, thus, are not literally true, nevertheless 
they do successfully capture real patterns of strategic interaction between bidders. 
They are, thus, able to track regularities between, say, auction format and size of 
bids.4 As we saw earlier, there are various ways in which more fl esh has been put on 
this rather vague initial thought—by viewing economic theory as capturing causal 
capacities, as idealizations requiring only that their assumptions hold, as positing 
credible worlds, or as positing partial structures, and so on. We have argued that, 
in any case, the evidence of the spectrum auction does not support any of these 
interpretations. But bracketing that conclusion temporarily, how might those 
interpretations make sense of economic progress?
Unfortunately, a major problem remains even with this more modest concep-
tion of progress, in which theory becomes better merely at capturing particular 
aspects of reality. The problem stems ultimately from the continuing emphasis 
on theory in isolation. Like all idealizations, economic theory is good at captur-
ing some things but less good at capturing others. For example, auction models 
capture patterns of strategic interaction between bidders but make no allowance 
for individual variations in agent psychology; for local details, such as software 
glitches or physical arrangement of bidders; and so on. How much do these omis-
sions matter? An answer is surely vital to any assessment of how valuable a model 
is, and hence to whether that model represents progress relative to other models 
that capture other things. Yet the importance of any given omission will inevitably 
depend on the particular application in question. In some contexts the omission 
of variation in agent psychology, for instance, will matter more than in others. The 
point is that there is no univocal general answer about the seriousness of a given 
omission, independent of the local details. It follows that no context-general sense 
of theoretical progress can be sustained, for a model may simultaneously have pro-
gressed with respect to one application but not to another. An overall score for that 
model’s progress could, therefore, only ever be a crude average of its scores over 
various particular applications, and would, therefore, carry no more weight than 
those applications’ selection criteria.
For instance, on the capacities account, the importance of the capacities a 
model captures relative to those it omits will vary, case by case. The problem equally 
infects the other accounts, too. The degree of ease with which assumptions can be 
de-idealized, the degree of credibility of a world, and the degree of importance of 
the portion of the total domain that a partial structure captures—all of these, even 
assuming rigorous sense can be made of them, also seem bound to vary, applica-
tion by application. The lesson is that, even when speaking of our more modest 
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conception of it, we can only make sense of economic progress context-specifi cally. 
We can, therefore, not make sense of it for any theoretical model in isolation, such 
as a particular auction model, say. Rather, we can, at best, speak of that auction 
model representing progress with respect to a specifi c application.
Next, fi nally, turn to the new twist put on these matters by analysis of the 
spectrum auctions. Alas, the lesson of that analysis is that to speak even of applica-
tion-specifi c progress is to be too optimistic. For, as we have seen, in the case of 
the spectrum auction at least, empirical warrant does not accrue to the theoreti-
cal model. The only confi rmed causal claim is with respect to the mechanism as 
a whole (that is, claim 3). That causal claim is made only by the mechanism, of 
course, not by any of the auction-theory models. This is why the theoretical mod-
els garner no support here. Rather, support accrues only to the fi nal mechanism 
used in the actual auction, and, thus, it is only that fi nal mechanism that has a 
claim to be close to the truth. Because that mechanism was the result of extensive 
experimental tweaking independent of the theoretical model, it is a mistake to 
think that the success of the auction implies any progress toward the truth on the 
part of theory, even application-specifi cally. Thus, the contrasting experiences of 
the New Zealand and United States auctions, for instance, speaks to progress with 
respect to fi nal mechanisms but not with respect to theoretical models. (Indeed, 
much the same theoretical repertoire was available in both cases.)
To sum up so far: The usual notion of scientifi c progress in the literature has 
been of successive theories approaching closer to the truth. This notion has proved 
problematic in general, for instance, because of language dependence. Even if we 
focus only on an agreed economic vocabulary, still economic theory is recognized 
by all to be highly idealized and, therefore, not a candidate for literal truth. A 
weaker claim is that economic theory nevertheless captures aspects or parts of 
the truth. But then we need to judge the relative importance of those aspects it 
captures and those it doesn’t. Any such judgment must inevitably be application-
specifi c, implying that theoretical models in isolation cannot be said to progress; 
rather, at best, they can be said to progress in capturing the truth about specifi c 
situations. Finally, the spectrum auction case suggests that even this last claim is 
not supportable, because the empirical warrant from successful applications in 
fact accrues only to fi nal concrete mechanisms that cannot be derived directly 
from theoretical models. If we interpret progress in the traditional way as increas-
ing closeness to truth, then, we have no reason to believe that economic theory is 
progressing.
Some Red Herrings
We shall offer a positive view, and address its implications for economic practice, 
shortly. Before that though, a little more negative work is required, in particular 
to dispose of some red herrings. First, a common fall-back defense of economic 
theory is that even if empirical warrant is elusive, still it provides ‘insight’ or at 
Harold Ch11.indd   329 10/25/2008   5:14:53 PM
330  microeconomics
UNCORRECTED PROOF
least is ‘suggestive’. For instance, an auction model illustrates how the winner’s 
curse comes about, or could come about, and thus increases our ‘understanding’ 
of that phenomenon. How are we to interpret the quoted terms? Can they carry 
any philosophical weight?
The most likely candidate for arguing so seems to be the view that theory 
provides explanation. In other words, auction theory explains why the winner’s 
curse comes about, for instance. But on any standard account of explanation, for 
a theory to do this it must have empirical warrant, and, given the essential role of 
the experimental test beds, that is just what close analysis of the spectrum auctions 
casts into doubt. Thus, an auction model does not, in conjunction with initial 
conditions, entail the successful auction outcome, as would be required on the 
deductive-nomological view. Neither does it provide the cause or mechanism that 
produced that outcome, as only the fi nal composite auction procedure achieves 
that. Neither fi nally does the theoretical model unify various phenomena, since on 
our view it does not on its own account for any phenomenon at all, let alone several 
different phenomena. The necessary empirical warrant is just what the theoretical 
models did not accrue in the case of the spectrum auction. Accordingly, we have 
no good reason to declare them explanatory of the auction’s success. In lieu of 
some alternative interpretation (on which see later), therefore, and with apologies 
to Hume, in our view, vague talk of such models providing insight or understand-
ing can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Next, and more generally, it is easy just to declare after the fact that some real-
world observation was explained by an economic model. The spectrum auction 
was different in that, it being a case of institution design, scientists faced the con-
straint of eventually having to actually run an auction and make it a success. This 
was, of course, a very different challenge to mere after-the-fact rationalization. 
And, although it might have looked casually as if, as the contemporary publicity 
claimed, the theoretical auction models indeed explained the outcome, as we have 
seen, the reality was more complicated. Judging by the example of the spectrum 
auction, therefore, there is ample reason to be cautious about attributions—after 
the fact and from a distance—of explanatory success to economic theory. When 
push came to shove and an actual working mechanism was required, it turned out 
not to be so.
A Positive Story—Economists as Engineers
We have seen the diffi culty of making sense of any variety of purely theoretical 
progress. That was the negative story; what is the positive one? For that, consider, 
again, the second option mentioned earlier, namely, that of understanding prog-
ress as progress in engineering know-how, that is, as progress in the practicali-
ties of applying economic theory. We believe this turns out to be a much better 
way to view the matter.5 Moreover, such a view of economic progress, as well as 
capturing the success of the spectrum auctions, also turns out to have normative 
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 implications for the development of economic theory more widely. (Of course, we 
do not mean to deny progress also in other applied economic tasks, such as mea-
suring new data.)
A helpful analogy here is with the development of racing cars, for instance 
the work of a Formula One team. The designers in such a team are faced with the 
challenge of maximizing a car’s speed and reliability while constrained by reg-
ulations concerning weight, tires, engine size, fuel capacity, and a host of other 
details. These regulations typically change each championship season. There is of 
course a lot of relevant theory to know and, for this reason, senior designers are 
highly trained engineers. Yet theoretical knowledge alone is not enough. All teams 
also have huge testing programs, analogous to the experimental test beds of the 
spectrum auction. For example, new chassis designs are tested extensively in wind 
tunnels, while in-house drivers take each new model for vast numbers of timed 
laps on private tracks. Engineers on all teams are highly educated and presumably 
have very similar levels of theoretical knowledge. Yet, of course, the fi nal results 
of their efforts—that is, each team’s cars in the races—are far from very similar. 
On the contrary, some are much more successful than others. And typically it is 
the teams with the biggest development and testing budgets that end up producing 
the winning cars. That is, within any one season, the quality of racing cars corre-
lates with teams’ development budgets rather than with their levels of theoretical 
knowledge.
Of course, theoretical knowledge is essential, too. No matter what the test-
ing budget, presumably no team would be competitive without knowledge of 
Newtonian mechanics, gas laws, the chemistry of fuel combustion, materials sci-
ence knowledge of rubber and lightweight composites, and so on. But it does sug-
gest that, just as the experimental test beds were essential to producing a successful 
spectrum auction design, so are the wind tunnels and practice laps essential to 
producing a successful racing car design. In both cases, abstract theory is neces-
sary but not suffi cient.
What does this tell us about progress? Within any one season, when regula-
tions are constant, there exists progress in racing car design in that the cars become 
faster and more reliable. Within that time span, the theoretical knowledge being 
employed presumably does not change signifi cantly. What does improve, rather, 
is the ability to apply it effectively. That is, the development of better racing cars 
through the season is due to the accumulation of new context-specifi c engineering 
know-how. It is not due to any global nearing to the truth of our underlying theo-
retical picture of the world.
The context-specifi city of such progress is refl ected by its limited exportability 
to new contexts. The know-how that a racing-car team accumulates through a sea-
son, just like the practical know-how that went into the spectrum auction design, 
is only exportable to a limited extent, or at least is not as exportable as the relevant 
theoretical knowledge. The success of one season’s car does not guarantee success 
under new regulations in the next season, as the sporting record has demonstrated 
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many times. Similarly, the successful design of a spectrum auction in the condi-
tions and regulations of one country does not necessarily carry over to those of a 
new country (Klemperer 2002b). In both cases, the context has changed, and, thus, 
a new round of practical know-how must be acquired. For this reason, just as the 
winning racing-car team often changes from season to season, so a successful auc-
tion design in one country will not necessarily be successful in a different coun-
try. Thus, the spectrum auction in Switzerland was a comparative failure, despite 
being run six years after the successful FCC one. Of course, these are matters of 
degree, and there is exportability to some extent—thus racing-car teams learn 
from previous designs, just as U.K. spectrum-auction designers in 2000 learned 
from their U.S. predecessors. But the point is the asymmetry between on one hand 
context-specifi c practical know-how with limited exportability, and on the other 
hand context-general theoretical knowledge with great exportability.
Progress and Theory Revisited
In sharp contrast to the kinds of theoretical progress discussed earlier, this con-
text-specifi c engineering progress is amply endorsed empirically. Thus, racing cars 
demonstrably do run faster and more reliably through the course of a season, just 
as the U.S. spectrum auction was demonstrably more successful than its predeces-
sors. Nevertheless, as repeatedly emphasized, a necessary condition for engineer-
ing success is relevant theory, namely, in the case of the spectrum auctions, the new 
game-theory auction models. So we have an apparent paradox: Although there is 
no warrant for claiming theoretical progress in the sense of empirical success or 
increased closeness to the truth, still theoretical progress in some sense is necessary 
for the context-specifi c engineering progress for which there is warrant.
So what might this other, different kind of theoretical progress amount to? We 
must be careful to avoid yet another, fi nal, red herring. In particular, one common 
thought is to view this different kind of theoretical progress as akin to progress 
in pure mathematics, a kind of internal progress of new concepts and categories, 
proofs and refi nements, and so forth. For example, modern theory has seen the 
development of such concepts as multiple equilibria and asymmetric information 
effects, and in turn how these effects interact with other factors such as different 
auction procedures. No doubt, this is progress in some sense—but not progress for 
which the spectrum auction provides any empirical warrant. And without a clear 
connection to empirical progress, it is not clear why, as scientists (as opposed to 
pure mathematicians), we should value it. How is it to be measured, for instance? 
Was asymmetric information a more important conceptual breakthrough than 
new notions of equilibrium? What criterion could we use to decide – an aesthetic 
one? Any criterion encompassing empirical success would seem inevitably to run 
into the same diffi culties that we discussed earlier, such as that the worth of these 
breakthroughs would be highly application-specifi c and dependent in any case on 
practical know-how, independent of theory.
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We think the underlying problem here is again the attempt to defi ne prog-
ress with respect to theory in isolation. To repeat: If the example of the spectrum 
auction is typical, then the only notion of progress in economics that is empiri-
cally warranted is of the context-specifi c engineering variety. Thus, the criterion 
for judging a new piece of theory should be: How much does it help economic 
engineers achieve empirical success? An expanding and dazzling theoretical rep-
ertoire of new methods, heuristics, and categories is, alas, of no empirical value in 
itself. Rather, it can only be valuable instrumentally. Nevertheless, this does at least 
fi nally yield us an indirect kind of theoretical progress, namely, that new theo-
retical development is progressive insofar as it generates useful new aids to the 
engineers.
The hard-nosed corollary is that theoretical developments that offer little 
prospect of being useable by economic engineers are of correspondingly little sci-
entifi c value.6 Of course, no one can ever know for sure in advance exactly which 
pieces of theory may eventually prove useful in this way. Readers will form their 
own judgment of the prospects for any particular example. Notice, however, that 
the issue is not the familiar one of pure versus applied research, wherein the former 
is damned by philistines as being perhaps noble in its pursuit of scientifi c truth 
but, alas, of no practical use. Rather, in the case of economics, the philistine argu-
ment is altogether stronger, namely, that the pure research cannot even be said to 
be pursuing scientifi c truth.
The design of the FCC spectrum auction is worthy of celebration. It was a 
tremendously sophisticated (and lucrative) piece of technology—on a par with, 
say, a laser or a jet airplane. Economic theory can be correspondingly proud of its 
contribution to this success. But the sting in the tail from the story is this: that it 
is only through such contributions that theory partakes of scientifi c progress. Its 
only glory is via its utility to those working elsewhere.
NOTES
Authors’ names listed in alphabetical order. The authors are equally and jointly 
responsible.
1. For an opposing view, see Nik-Khah (2008). He argues that in fact the auctions’ 
only success was large revenues. Other objectives, such as decentralization of ownership 
and promotion of wireless technology in rural areas, were not met. Cramton 1998 and 
2006 mostly disagrees. For our purposes, it is enough to say that the auctions were a more 
successful piece of technology than previous alternatives (such as the auction designs 
used in other countries, or nonmarket mechanisms).
2. Notice also the historical origin of McMillan’s protheorist paper. McMillan was 
originally hired by the FCC as an independent advisor—independent in the sense that 
he was not at the same time employed by a potential bidder. His task was to help the 
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FCC arbitrate between the confl icting advice received from game theorists employed 
by the different telecoms fi rms. As we shall see, game theory did not give a univocal 
answer to the question of which auction design would maximize effi ciency. (It was 
through this hole that the telecoms companies were able to present their suggestions 
as being justifi ed by considerations of effi ciency when, in fact, the motivation was 
self-interest—Nik-Khah 2008.) In an attempt to explain the FCC’s eventual decisions, 
McMillan produced a report that synthesized the debates that were taking place 
between the theorists (FCC 1994a). This report eventually turned into his 1994 paper. 
The primary purpose of the report might, thus, not have been to show what exactly 
theory can and cannot do for auction designers, but rather only to show that the FCC 
was aware of the confl ict between different theoretical considerations and took that 
into account. So to this extent, McMillan’s paper may, by political necessity, have been 
in part a public relations exercise.
3. Strictly speaking, we should not speak of Fs causing Bs “in the model.” The causal 
dependence of Bs on Fs cannot simply be read off the deductive relations between the 
assumptions describing Fs and Bs. Rather, it is an interpretation given to the model using 
some background knowledge.
4. It may be disputed whether scientifi c progress is best viewed as progress toward 
truth or, instead, as progress only toward some lesser goal, such as better predictions, 
interventions, or empirical descriptions. None of our arguments turn on this general 
issue. We shall be emphasizing empirical success, but presumably such success would, in 
any case, be the best reason to believe in the metaphysically stronger claims of a model’s 
truth or approximate truth.
5. Ken Binmore, chief designer of the extremely successful UK spectrum auctions 
of 1999 and 2000, sees his achievement as being akin to engineering in exactly this way 
(personal communication, one of the authors).
6. As mentioned in footnote 4, this remains true whether we understand scientifi c value 
to mean “closeness to the truth” or mere “empirical success”. We are committed though 
to scientifi c value, implying something beyond mere mathematics-type, purely abstract 
theoretical development. Similar remarks apply to scientifi c truth and scientifi c progress below.
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